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Abstract
In an information transmission situation, a senders concern for its credibil-
ity could endow itself with an invisible power to control the receivers decisions
so that the sender can manipulate information without being detected. In this
case, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without losing its credibility,
which stays true even when the sender and the receiver have contradictory pref-
erences. Therefore, the senders concern for its credibility could result in less
truthful signals from the sender and worse payo¤s to the receiver. This is the
paradox of credibility. This paper models this paradoxical role of the senders
credibility concern.
Journal of Economic Literature classication numbers: C72, D82, D83.
Keywords: Anti-coordination game, Credibility, Information Transmission,
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1 Introduction
In an information transmission situation between a sender and a receiver, suppose
that the sender cares about its credibility in reporting truthful information. We might
naturally expect that the sender would signal more truthfully than when it does
not care about its credibility, and thus the receiver would be better o¤. In reality,
however, this sender, who cares about its credibility, would be endowed with an
invisible power to control the receivers actions exactly due to its credibility concern,
and can consequently manipulate information without being detected. As a result,
the sender could achieve its favored outcomes without losing its credibility while
the receiver would lose its favored outcomes that were otherwise achievable in the
absence of the senders credibility concern. Therefore, when the sender cares about
I am grateful to Antonio Marasco and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions.
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its credibility in reporting truthful information, the sender might signal less truthfully
and the receiver would be worse o¤. This is the paradox of credibility.
To see how the senders concern for its credibility endows the sender with an
invisible power to inuence the receivers actions, consider a Hawk-Dove game with
incomplete information. In the standard Hawk-Dove game, there are two players,
1 and 2, and they choose either Hawk or Dove simultaneously. Regarding their
preferences, they both prefer to play di¤erently from what the other does. Into this
Hawk-Dove game, we introduce 2s types so that 2 can be either normal with high
probability or aggressive with low probability. If 2 is normal, its preference is the
same as in the standard Hawk-Dove game. If 2 is aggressive, it views Hawk as a
dominant action. Player 2s type is its private information and 2 signals to 1 its type
before they choose Hawk or Dove.
In this Hawk-Dove game with incomplete information, suppose that 1 tries to
play Hawk regardless of 2s signals. Then, responding to this 1s strategy, 2 will
play Hawk when it is aggressive and will play Dove when it is normal. That is, 2
reveals its type through its actions. So, if 2 signals untruthfully, it would lose its
credibility in reporting truthful information. In this situation, if 2 does not care
about its credibility, 2 can signal untruthfully. Let 2 signal the normal type always.
Accordingly, responding to 2s strategy, 1s strategy, to play Hawk regardless of the
signals, is one of the best responses because the probability of 2s being aggressive
is small. Therefore, their strategies constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and in
this equilibrium outcome, 1 can achieve its favored outcome.
However, if 2 cares about its credibility, 2 will signal truthfully. Then, when 2
has signaled the aggressive type, 1 has an incentive to change its action from Hawk
to Dove in order to play di¤erently from what 2 does. Consequently, in equilibrium,
1 cannot ignore 2s signal. Once 1 responds to the signal, then 2 can inuence 1s
actions by manipulating its information. For example, if 1 plans to play Dove when
2 has signaled the aggressive type and plans to play Hawk when 2 has signaled the
normal type, then by signaling the aggressive type player 2 can inuence 1 to play
Dove. Here, 1 cannot distinguish 2s real types, thus 2 will not lose its credibility.
Therefore, if player 2 cares about its credibility in reporting truthful information,
then 2 is endowed with the invisible power to control 1s actions, and as a result 2
can always achieve its favored outcome without losing its credibility.
Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 formally models the para-
doxical role of the senders credibility. Finally, Section 4 presents summaries and
conclusions.
2 Related Literature
Information transmission situations have been studied in cheap talk games, such as
Crawford and Sobel (1982), Farrell and Gibbons (1989), Farrell and Rabin (1996),
etc. The cheap talk game presumes a special assumption that signals from the sender
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are irrelevant to the senders payo¤s. Thus, the receiver does not need to believe
senders signals, and consequently, only when they have common interests, senders
signals can be e¤ective. Therefore, the sender might not be able to achieve its favored
outcome (see also Farrell, 1993; Austen-Smith, 1994; Seidmann and Winter, 1997).
The present study adopts the basic setting of a cheap talk game. However, it departs
from the cheap talk game by assuming that the sender cares about its credibility, and
thus signals from the sender are relevant to the senders payo¤s. This intention of the
sender for its credibility makes signals from the sender e¤ective even when the sender
and the receiver have contradictory preferences. Therefore, the sender can achieve its
favored outcome without losing its credibility.
Sobel (1985) and Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) also studied the senders credi-
bility in their models. In Sobels paper (1985), a sender has multiple possible types
and has an incentive to pretend to be a truth-telling type to improve its future pay-
o¤s. In other words, with a primary concern of improving its future payo¤s, the
sender adopts a truthtelling actions as the means to achieve its goal, giving others
the fabricated impression about its type. This is how a sender appears to care about
its credibility without any genuine and direct concern for its credibility (see also Ben-
abou and Laroque, 1992; Kim, 1996; and Conlon, 1993). The current study, on the
other hand, assumes that the sender directly cares about its credibility and focuses
on the e¤ect of the credibility concern on the information transmission situation
Similarly, Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) also assumed that a sender directly cares
about its credibility. They assumed that the sender su¤ers from untruthful signaling
itself because it has a preference for honesty. Consequently, they showed that the
sender might signal more truthfully than in the cheap talk game due to its credibility
concern (see also Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani 2007). In the present study, in
contrast to their work, the sender does not put any intrinsic value on honesty. Thus,
the sender has no incentive to tell the truth as long as its lie would not be detected,
and therefore the sender might signal less truthfully than in the cheap talk game. The
sole concern for credibility without any intrinsic value on honesty gives the sender an
invisible power to manipulate information and produce the paradoxical outcome.
Originally, this study stems from Jung (2007). Through comprehensive analyses
in a general model, Jung (2007) studied information manipulation through the media
and showed that if a sender reports information through the media and cares about
its credibility, then the sender can successfully manipulate information without being
detected. This study highlights the credibility issue and explores in depth the e¤ect
that a senders concern for credibility may have. The current paper excludes the
role of the media in the information transmission situation, yet shows still that the
sender can successfully manipulate information without being detected due to the
paradoxical role of its credibility concern.
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3 Model
Two players (1 and 2) play a Hawk-Dove game with incomplete information. In this
game, 2 has two possible types while 1 has only one type. So, 2 can be either aggressive
or normal while 1 is always normal. Player 2s type is its private information and
the probability of 2s being aggressive is p 2 (0; 1]. Incomplete information lies only
in 2s type. When both players are normal, they play a Hawk-Dove game. On the
other hand, when 2 is aggressive, they play a modied version of Hawk-Dove game in
which 2 has a preference for playing Hawk. In this model, before the players play the
Hawk-Dove game, 2 signals to 1 either that 2 is aggressive (A) or that 2 is normal
(N). Then in the Hawk-Dove game, they each choose either to play Hawk (H) or to
play Dove (D) simultaneously. So, this game proceeds as follows. At stage zero, 2s
type is chosen. Only 2 detects its own type. At stage one, 2 signals either A or N to
1. At stage two, both 1 and 2 each simultaneously choose D or H. After all actions
are taken, payo¤s are realized.
Regarding the payo¤s, player 1s payo¤s depend only on both its actions and
2s actions, and they together determine the outcomes in the Hawk-Dove game.
On the other hand, 2s payo¤s depend on its signals as well as both its actions
and 1s actions. This is done by assuming that 2 cares about its credibility that
is determined by its signals as well as the outcomes in the Hawk-Dove game. In
the absence of 2s concern for its credibility, the players payo¤s, determined by
the outcomes in the Hawk-Dove game, are given by the following matrixes. In
these matrixes, 1 chooses a row and 2 a column,
When player 2 is aggressive
D H
D 3; (2 R) 1; 0(> )
H 4; (2 R) 0; 0(> )
When player 2 is normal
D H
D 3; 3 1; 4
H 4; 1 0; 0
Table 1: Payo¤Matrixes in the Absence of 2s Credibility Concern
where the rst entry in each cell is 1s payo¤ for the corresponding actions and
the second entry is 2s.
In addition to these payo¤s, player 2s credibility concern also a¤ects its nal
payo¤s. In equilibrium outcomes, 2may reveal the information about its type through
its actions. So, 1 can judge the truthfulness of 2s signals based on 2s actions. Thus, if
2 is proven to have lied, then 2 will lose its credibility in reporting truthful information
(CT ), and as a result 2 will lose  > 0 amount of extra payo¤ since 2 cares about its
credibility. For example, suppose there exists an equilibrium in which 2 plays H when
it is aggressive and plays D when it is normal. Then in these equilibrium outcomes,
1 can be certain that 2 is aggressive when 2 has played H and that 2 is normal when
2 has played D. In this case, if 2 has signaled A and plays D, or if 2 has signaled
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N and plays H, then 1 is certain that 2 has lied. Thus, 2 will lose its CT , and as a
result 2 will lose the extra payo¤ .
Formally, player 2s concern for its CT is modeled as follows. Let S1 and S2 be
the pure-strategy spaces for 1 and 2, respectively, and let H be the set of all histories
after all actions are taken, i:e: H  fH;DgfA;NgfH;Dg where the rst fH;Dg
is an action space for 1. Also, let  : H  S1  S2  ! [0; 1] be the posterior such
that for each history h 2 H and each strategy prole s 2 S1S2, (h; s) denotes the
posterior probability that, according to Bayesrule, 1 puts on 2s being hawkish at h
when the players follow s. Finally, let [ ] : R  ! Z be the greatest integer function,
which assigns each x 2 R the greatest integer less than or equal to x, and for each
R 2 fA;Ng, let 1R : H  S1  S2  ! f0; 1g be the indicator function such that for
each (h; s) 2 H  S1  S2, 1R(h; s) = 1 if and only if h is a possible outcome under s
and h includes R. Then, 2s concern for its CT is formulated by the Credibility-Loss
function L : S1  S2  ! R such that
L(s) = 
X
h2H
fp[(h; s)]1N(h; s) + (1  p)[1  (h; s)]1A(h; s)g
where  measures how much 2 values its CT and L(s) denotes the expected payo¤
loss when the players follow s. This credibility-loss function reects the principle of
Presumption of Innocence, which means the accused is presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty, by adopting the greatest integer function [ ]1.
To see how 2s credibility concern changes the results, rst consider the case in
which 2 does not care about its CT 2. Then, the game can have two possible outcomes
in the pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. First, if the probability p that 2 is
aggressive satises 1
2
 p, then the combination of outcomes HH and HD in which
1 always plays H and 2 plays D only when it is normal is possible in equilibrium.
In these outcomes, 1s expected payo¤ is 4   4p ( 2) and 2s expected payo¤ is
p0+(1 p). Second, the players can achieve the DH outcomes regardless of 2s type
in which 1 plays D and 2 plays H. In this outcome, 1s expected payo¤ is one and
2s expected payo¤ is p0 + 4(1   p). Therefore, if 1
2
 p holds, then 1 prefers the
former outcome combination to the latter because of the higher expected payo¤ in
the former. Player 2s preference, on the other hand, depends on the parameters 0
and 0. If
p0 + 4(1  p) > p0 + (1  p) (1)
holds, 2 prefers the latter outcome to the former. Then, how does 2s credibility
concern change the results? Theorem 1 answers this question.
1The credibility-loss function can reect principles other than the presumption of Innocence. For
example, if the greatest integer function is replaced with the least integer function, which assigns
each x 2 R the least integer more than or equal to x, then the credibility-loss function would reect
the principle of Presumption of Guilt.
2This case can be described as  = 0.
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Theorem 1 Pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria exist. If Inequality (1) holds,
then in the equilibrium outcomes, player 1 plays only D and player 2 plays only H
without losing its CT .
Proof. Let (a; b) 2 S1 where a is an action when A has been signaled and b is an
action when N has been signaled. In addition, let (a; b; c; d; e; f) 2 S2 where a is a
signal when 2 is aggressive, b is a signal when 2 is normal, c is an action when 2 is
aggressive and has signaled A, d is an action when 2 is aggressive and has signaled
N , e is an action when 2 is normal and has signaled A, and f is an action when 2 is
normal and has signaled N . Next, every pure-strategy of player 1 is examined.
First, let player 1 play (D;D). Note that when 2 is aggressive and has signaled A
or when 2 is normal and has signaledN , 2 will not lose its CT regardless of its actions.
So, 2s best response to (D;D) includes the actions (; ; H; ; ; H). Then, In the cases
in which 2 is aggressive and has signaled N and in which 2 is normal and has signaled
A, 2 can avoid to lose its CT if 2 plays H. Thus, H becomes the best response
in these cases because it is the best response in the absence of 2s credibility con-
cern. That is, 2s best response to (D;D) must include the actions (; ; H;H;H;H).
Here, (A;A;H;H;H;H), (A;N;H;H;H;H), and (N;N;H;H;H;H) give 2 the ex-
pected payo¤ pa0+4(1  p). However, (N;A;H;H;H;H) gives 2 the expected payo¤
pa0+4(1 p)  because 2 will lose its CT under this strategy. So, (A;A;H;H;H;H),
(A;N;H;H;H;H), and (N;N;H;H;H;H) are the best responses to 1s strategy
(D;D). Next, 1s best response to (; ; H;H;H;H) is (D;D). Therefore, 2s strate-
gies (A;A;H;H;H;H), (A;N;H;H;H;H), and (N;N;H;H;H;H) constitute perfect
Bayesian equilibria together with 1s strategy (D;D).
Second, let 1 play (D;H). Then, 2s best response includes (; ; H; ; ; D). First,
consider the case in which 2s best response to (D;H) can include (A; ; H; ; ; D). In
this case, (A;A;H; ; H;D) guarantees the better payo¤ to 2 than (A;N;H; ; H;D)
and (A; ; H; ; D;D) do. So, 2s best response can include only (A;A;H; ; H;D).
Note that (A;A;H;H;H;D) is the best response to (D;H) in each continuation game,
but (A;A;H;D;H;D) is not the best response in the continuation game in which 2 is
aggressive and has signaled N . Next, 1s best response to (A;A;H;H;H;D) can be
(D;H). Consequently, if 2s best response to (D;H) can include (A; ; H; ; ; D), then
(D;H) and (A;A;H;H;H;D) constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Second, con-
sider the other case in which 2s best response to (D;H) can include (N; ; H; ; ; D).
In this case, 2 can get p +(1  p) by playing (N;N;H;D; ; D) and can get p(0  )
+(1   p) by playing (N;N;H;H; ; D). Note that 2 can get p0+ 4(1   p) by
playing (A;A;H;H;H;D). If Inequality (1) holds, then p0+ 4(1   p) > maxfp
+(1   p); p(0   ) +(1   p)g. Thus, with respect to 1s strategy (D;H), 2s strat-
egy (A;A;H;H;H;D) dominates the strategies including the signals and the actions
(N;N;H; ; ; D). So, responding to (D;H), 2 will not play (N;N;H; ; ; D). If 2 plays
(N;A;H; ; ; D), then 2 would lose its CT for sure, so 2 would play (N;A;H;H;H;D).
Next, 1s best response to (N;A;H;H;H;D) is not (D;H), but (H;H). Conse-
quently, (D;H) and (N; ; H; ; ; D) cannot constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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Therefore, if Inequality (1) holds and there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in-
cluding (D;H), then in this equilibrium, 2 will play (A;A;H;H;H;D), thus 1 will
play only D and 2 will play only H without losing its CT in this equilibrium outcome.
Third, let 1 play (H;D). Then, 2s best response includes (; N;H; ; ; H), and thus
it must include (; N;H; ; D;H) in order to be the best response in each continuation
game. Here, together with (H;D), 2s strategy (A;N;H; ; D;H) cannot constitute
an equilibrium because (A;N;H; ; D;H) causes player 1 to change its strategy from
(H;D) to (H;H). So, if (H;D) constitutes an equilibrium, then 2s best response
to (H;D) must include (N;N;H; ; D;H), and thus it must be (N;N;H;H;D;H)
because it produces the higher payo¤ to 2 than (N;N;H;D;D;H) does. Therefore,
if (H;D) is part of an equilibrium, then in this equilibrium outcome, 1 will play only
D and 2 will play only H without losing its CT .
Finally, let 1 play (H;H). Then, 2s best response includes (; ; H; ; ; D). If 2
plays (; ; H;H;D;D), then 2 would signal truthfully, i:e: (A;N;H;H;D;D), since
untruthful signals only cause player 2 to lose its CT . Then, responding to (A;N;H;H;
D;D), 1 would have an incentive to change its strategy from (H;H) to (D;H). If 2
plays (; ; H; ; H;D) or (A;N;H;D;D;D), then 1 would have an incentive to change
its strategy from (H;H) to (D; ). In addition, with respect to 1s strategy (H;H), 2s
strategy (A;N;H;H;D;D) dominates (A;A;H;D;D;D), (N;A;H;D;D;D), and
(N;N;H;D;D;D), and thus these strategies cannot be the best response to (H;H).
Therefore, there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium that includes 1s strategy (H;H).
This completes the proof.
Theorem 1 means that if player 2 prefers the DH outcome to the combination
of outcomes HH and HD, which is shown in Inequality (1), and if 2 cares about
its CT , which means  > 0, then only the DH outcome is possible in pure-strategy
perfect Bayesian equilibrium and 2 can still maintain its CT . Thus, 2 successfully
manipulates its information without being detected. This is because 2 can inuence
1 to play D according to its preferences. In this model, 1 cannot completely ignore
2s signal because of 2s credibility concern. Once 1 responds to 2s signal, 2 can
inuence 1s actions by manipulating its information. Therefore, this model shows
that 2s credibility concern can paradoxically endow 2 with an invisible power to
successfully manipulate its information, and as a result if p  1
2
, player 1 loses its
favored outcomes in equilibrium.
This result is strong in that it does not depend on p (> 0), the probability that
2 is aggressive, and  (> 0), the value that 2 puts on its CT . That is, no matter
how small, but positive, the probability of 2s being aggressive is or no matter how
great 2s concern for its CT is, player 1 cannot achieve the combination of outcomes
HH and HD. In addition, this result can be generalized so that we can replace
the setting of the model, the Hawk-Dove game with incomplete information, with
a general coordination or anti-coordination game with incomplete information while
preserving the result similar to Theorem 1.
Furthermore, we can extend this model by introducing an aggressive type for
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player 1 and allowing 1 to signal its type before they play the Hawk-Dove game. In
this case, if 1 does not care about its CT , then Theorem 1 holds for this extended
model regardless of their signaling ways; sequentially or simultaneously. On the
other hand, if 1 cares about its CT , then the results might change. In particular, if
both players care about their CT slightly so that aggressive players have a dominant
action H regardless of their credibility loss, i:e:   1, then no pure-strategy perfect
Bayesian equilibrium exists. This is because both players have the same power to
control the others actions, and so the game becomes a discoordination situation. For
example, if they try to play the DH outcome when they are both normal, then 1
has an incentive to reveal its type because of its credibility concern. Then, when 1
reveals it as an aggressive type, normal player 2 has an incentive to change its action
from H to D. Then by manipulating its information, 1 can make 2 play D, and thus
they would play the HD outcome when they are both normal. Then again, 2 has an
incentive to reveal its type and the story repeats the previous reasoning. Therefore,
in this case, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
In Theorem 1, the su¢ cient and necessary condition for the unique outcome DH
in equilibrium is that i) p0 +4(1  p) > p +(1  p) and p0 +4(1  p) > p(0   )
+(1 p) or ii)  < 3. So, it is possible that 2 prefers the combination of outcomesHH
and HD to the DH outcome, but 2 cannot achieve the combination in equilibrium.
This is because the normal player 2 always prefers the DH outcome to the HD
outcome and so it tries to manipulate its information. As a result, if 2 prefers the
DH outcome to the other outcomes, or if the aggressive player 2 cannot e¤ectively
force the normal player 2 not to manipulate its information, the unique outcome
in equilibrium will be the DH outcome. The former situation is formulated in the
condition i) above and the latter situation is formulated in the condition ii) above.
In this model, however, a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists for limited parameters
and the outcomes in the mixed-strategy equilibrium can result in player 1s playing
H with positive probabilities. Moreover, if the presumption of innocence is replaced
with another principle, such as the presumption of guilt, and also if  is large enough,
then 2 might signal its type truthfully, and as a result the players could achieve the
HD outcomes in pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium3.
4 Conclusions
Suppose that a sender and a receiver play the Hawk-Dove game with incomplete in-
formation and the sender cares about its credibility in reporting truthful information.
Then, the sender can make the receiver play the senders favored outcome without
3In application, any principle other than the presumption of innocence causes a fatal problem.
This is because, in reality, the receiver can observe only outcomes, but not strategies. So, the receiver
cannot check whether it correctly forecasts the senders strategy. However, any principle other than
the presumption of innocence postulates that the receiver can check whether it correctly forecasts
the senders strategy.
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losing its credibility by manipulating its information.
The ndings derived from the Hawk-Dove game with incomplete information can
be extended to a general coordination or anti-coordination game with incomplete in-
formation. This is because, just like the receiver in the Hawk-Dove game, receivers
in the general coordination or anti-coordination game cannot completely ignore the
signal from a sender due to the senders credibility concern. As a result, the sender
can successfully inuence the receivers to play the senders favored outcomes by ma-
nipulating information.
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